Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of Post-Disaster Political Spaces and Foreign Relations

Ashley Persaud, External Submission

January 18, 2022

In August 2005, the levees safeguarding New Orleans collapsed and approximately 80 percent of the city flooded. The impacts of the flooding varied based upon the region, but New Orleans was significantly impacted in comparison to surrounding communities. A vast number of people faced rapid change following the event. Chunks of the population suddenly faced homelessness, businesses were impacted, jobs were lost, and the cost of the Hurricane’s damages skyrocketed. The majority of the recovery funding did not include the reconstruction of impacted areas. Hurricane Katrina is the largest residential disaster in U.S. history.

The research field of disaster politics focuses on the geographical study of the political impacts and consequences of disasters. The effects and implications of disasters are examined to develop a framework guiding the analysis of post-disaster political spaces. In specific, disaster politics analysis pays attention to the relationship between social and political actors and framing institutions in order to establish and address extreme natural disaster events . Furthermore, the study of disaster politics suggests that extreme events and their management are integrated in political history. I will argue that the sociopolitical changes that emerged after Hurricane Katrina are best explained through the lens of Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill’s  analytical framework which uses “tipping-point” indicators to explain these changes. Research suggests that disasters emerge from pre-existing social conditions and have the power to catalyse or trigger further amendments in socio-ecological systems. The paper will begin by outlining the criteria of the framework. Then, one of the key tipping-points which was observed during Hurricane Katrina will be analyzed through this lens, that of which took place at the international level. 


OUTLINE OF PELLING AND DILL’S FRAMEWORK 

Pelling and Dill’s research seeks to identify general trends or features of disaster politics based upon their observations, and found that disasters pose a critical juncture and tipping point in the social contract or political will. Each facet of their criterion can provide a basis of structure and transparency for analysis in the cycle of disaster and political change from a wide view perspective. The framework essentially evaluates disaster impacts from within the lens of evolution in the development history of a polity. 

The first tipping point or post-disaster moment is motivated from the baseline by civil society. From this perspective, disasters lead to critical junctures in the social contract and present tipping points, which are catalysts that open up or constrain political change. The following standards analyze common trends from this perspective: 

1) The first moment draws attention to the disproportionate social and spatial distribution of risk, which can result in inquiry regarding discourse of underlying

development failures and imbalances in the social contract/political will . Disasters can emphasize regional, ethnic, class inequality and become integrated in the initial or ongoing political struggles in this respect. Alternatively, disasters can be used by powerful elites to further marginalize these groups. 

2) The second approach to the tipping point is drawn from a “top down” outcome of international diplomacy. This includes disaster reconstruction funded by governments, international financial institutions, and NGO’s from abroad . All of this can overreach the state and motivate initiatives at the local level that open up the methods of political and social change. On the other hand, local political elites can absorb funds provided by external actors and utilize them to strengthen their level of authority and power. 


FRAMEWORK APPLICATION AT AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Hurricane Katrina is one of the costliest disasters in the history of the United States, and this affected the entire economy of the world’s richest and most powerful nation. Hurricane Katrina revealed significant inadequacies in federal, state, and local preparedness for responding to such a disastrous event. The devastation that followed appeared to be above the US government's capacity to handle, and aid was offered by a number of states in varying scales of conflict with the US. The international feedback to the disaster and the US government’s response was influenced by the context of the US government’s foreign policy stance as a state. Some research proposes that disaster-related events can induce international cooperation between or among enemy states, but it is also found that there are multiple purposes

that are either positive or negative, that are evident in disaster diplomacy outcomes. State actors approach disaster diplomacy for the following reasons: self preservation, mutual benefit, long-term global gains that may require short-term self-sacrifice, reaffirmation of traditional prejudices and enmity, and to demonstrate humanitarianism. The US’s decisions in responding to foreign aid and influence extends beyond the act itself, and represents larger political balances of vulnerability that influence perceptions of international relations and the political power and authority within. 

US foreign policy was influential in how aid was responded to. Just before Hurricane Katrina, President George W. Bush began his presidency in 2001. The Bush government defined a foreign policy framework that aimed to improve international relations work without full examination of non-domestic implications. The foreign policy stance contained elements classified as isolationist (the US would be less involved in world affairs), hegemonic (US foreign policy aimed to propagate values and ideas deemed significant by the state), and unilateralist (the US decision making process in IR would require limited consultation with other state actors). The United States at the time, essentially took a strong stance on national independence and self-interest in it’s relationship with other international actors. 

The manner in which the United States responded to foreign aid during Hurricane Katrina is reflective of the nation’s stance on receiving aid. Regardless of political disagreement or conflict with the US, 133 foreign countries and 12 international organizations offered aid during the disaster. However, of all the aid offered in both cash and oil following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the US accepted only a fraction of the total amount proposed.

This suggests that the reason the US did not accept foreign aid was because aid is a political tool, and the US took this stance to avoid political influence. To elaborate on the connection between foreign aid and international diplomacy, Venezuela offered to supply food, oil, water, aid workers, and soldiers but the US government failed to confirm the acceptance of the offer. On 1 September 2005, President Bush responded to media outlets by stating that the US has not asked for international aid and that the country was capable of rising up to the challenges surrounding the disaster. The US government denied claims of position changes. However, subsequently on the same day, the State Department confirmed that the White House would accept offers of foreign assistance. Hurricane Katrina was the first time that publically available US documents reflected the United State’s need for or acceptance of international aid. 

Foreign aid as a critical juncture presented an opening for methods of political and social change that the United States was not willing to embrace from other state actors or international institutions. In light of Pelling and Dill’s analytical framework, the circumvention of the state posed a threat to the United State’s foreign aid stance. Pelling and Dill’s facet in which political elites can absorb external funds to strengthen authority and power, contrasts with the foreign aid stance the US took during Hurricane Katrina. The United States maintained the state’s level of authority and power out of self-interest from their foreign position as a superpower state. The nation’s isolationist position essentially reflects the tipping point drawn from a “top down” outcome of international diplomacy, but in a different way due to the state’s rejection of the top down approach itself. The disaster catalyst was used to constrain political change rather than open it up from an international level in this sense. The United State’s response to disaster

diplomacy indicates that the US government would rather maintain its foreign policy stance despite the circumstances surrounding Hurricane Katrina. It is important to remember that the motives behind Hurricane Katrina disaster diplomacy are highly complex and varied. Other explanations propose: that the US was too distracted by Hurricane Katrina to focus on foreign policy or the US was uncertain about how to approach foreign policy in context of a domestic disaster. The latter can be supported by the fact that the United States never accepted disaster assistance directly from foreign countries until Hurricane Katrina. 


ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE EVENTS OF KATRINA AND FRAMEWORK

Disasters pose as a critical juncture in the social contract or political will and present catalysts that open up or constrain political change. Although the US refused foreign aid, the state was still influenced by international responses, which contributed towards the tipping point in which the nation strengthened disaster response and prevention. A Failure of Initiative was a final government report outlining every aspect of the government’s preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina, and the Select Committee identified failures at all levels of government that significantly undermined individuals, organizations, first responders, and others. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned is another example of the state’s response and is also a pivotal example of a tipping point that strengthened disaster response and prevention. The report outlines the need for active Federal Management of National Preparedness to foster transformation and focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the federal government, state governments, local governments, private sectors, and communities and individual citizens in catastrophic events. One approach to this includes the adoption of an

equation of disaster need: the magnitude of the disaster times the vulnerability of the population divided by the capacity to respond. 


CONCLUSION 

The failure of the US government and its officials resulted in preventable deaths, mass suffering, and significant delays in relief to those who needed it the most. The Katrina disaster diplomacy serves as a baseline for monitoring future developments, and assessing the effects and implications in post-disaster politics through Pelling and Dill’s analytical framework, revealed that “tipping-point” indicators help to explain these changes. Key tipping-points observed during Hurricane Katrina, were analyzed through this lens of understanding, at the international level. The US failed in preparing for Hurricane Katrina significantly, and the state faced domestic and international attention because of it. Human security was put at risk, and ethnic and class inequality played a role in the impact of the disaster on those populations. The disaster integrated with the criteria of initial political struggle resulted in inquiry regarding discourse of underlying development failures and imbalances in the social contract/political will as defined by Pelling and Dill. Despite all of the hardships and atrocities, there was a critical juncture that took place, and this opened the door for updated disaster response tactics and amendments. The US government had to learn from this experience the hard way: through grotesque failure.